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Abstract—Clouds are distributed Internet-based platforms 
that provide highly resilient and scalable environments to be 
used by enterprises in a multitude of ways. Cloud computing 
offers enterprises technology innovation that business leaders 
and IT infrastructure managers can choose to apply based on 
how and to what extent it helps them fulfil their business 
requirements. It is crucial that all technical consultants have a 
rigorous understanding of the ramifications of cloud computing 
as its influence is likely to spread the complete IT landscape. 
Security is one of the major concerns that is of practical interest 
to decision makers when they are making critical strategic 
operational decisions. Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) 
attacks are becoming more frequent and effective over the past 
few years, since the widely publicised DDoS attacks on the 
financial services industry that came to light in September and 
October 2012 and resurfaced in the past two years. In this paper, 
we introduce advanced cloud security technologies and practices 
as a series of concepts and technology architectures, from an 
industry-centric point of view. This is followed by classification of 
intrusion detection and prevention mechanisms that can be part 
of an overall strategy to help understand identify and mitigate 
potential DDoS attacks on business networks.  The paper 
establishes solid coverage of security issues related to DDoS and 
virtualisation with a focus on structure, clarity, and well-defined 
blocks for mainstream cloud computing security solutions and 
platforms. In doing so, we aim to provide industry technologists, 
who may not be necessarily cloud or security experts, with an 
effective tool to help them understand the security implications 
associated with cloud adoption in their transition towards more 
knowledge-based systems. 
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Service; Intrusion Detection; Intrusion Prevention; Virtualisation 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Cloud computing is a growing facet of the technical 
infrastructure of modern information systems.  It provides a 
way to deliver the demand of users for near consistent access to 
their data and software resources regardless of their physical 
position [1].  Many industries have already adopted cloud 
computing given the benefits, such as the elasticity, agility, 
adaptability and availability, that it brings to the Information 
Technology (IT) infrastructure [2].  The cloud model reduces 
industrial costs by simplifying the process of installing 
hardware and software updates and ensuring availability and 
adaptability of computing resources as required. These 
properties allow resources to be deployed as necessary to 
manage peak capacity or to support prolonged industrial 
growth.  Cloud computing allows a rapid response to these 
demands when compared to traditional IT models, where 
resources has to be managed and installed on-premise causing 
both high start-up and maintenance costs.  In the cloud model, 
resources are rented, often autonomously, as required from the 
Cloud Service Provider (CSP).  Equally, resources can be 
returned to the ‘pool’ when not being used leading to greater 
resource utilisation efficiency, lower cost and ‘greener’ 
computing [3].  This flexible infrastructure allows industries to 
focus on their own business processes, while the computing 
elements are managed by a CSP rather than by the company’s 
own IT departments.  Some companies choose to make use of 
internal private clouds allowing them to dynamically deploy 
their own computing resources as appropriate. 
The cloud computing model relies on maintaining a certain 
level of trust between clients and providers to ensure that 
client’s data is secure and that an agreed Quality of Service 
(QoS) is provided at all times.  There is also trust from the 
providers to the clients to avoid malicious activity against the 
provider either through direct, e.g., insider attacks, or indirect 
means, e.g., security flaws in applications that are deployed on 
the cloud.  Changes in the user’s use of resources is monitored 
by the CSP.  Unusual discrepancies in this use can affect trust 
in the user and therefore affect the services they receive [4]. 
One issue that has hampered the uptake of cloud computing 
by businesses is the issue of security.  This covers the security 
concerns of all stakeholders from end users, to clients and to 
the CSPs themselves.  The relationships between clients and 
CSPs are underlined by service agreements, which define the 
service that clients should receive.  These agreements define 
the responsibilities of all parties with regards to accessibility, 
data integrity, confidentiality and security. 
The power of the cloud is a tempting target for exploitation 
from attackers aiming to launch further attacks.  In 2011, a 
hacker used Amazon’s Elastic Computing Cloud Service 
(EC2) to attack Sony’s online entertainment systems, 
compromising more than 100 million customer accounts.  This 
was the largest data breach in U.S. history [5].  A similar attack 
was later used to prevent users from logging on to Sony 
services [6].  Another example of the power of the cloud being 
utilised for malicious activity is shown in the work by Thomas 
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Roth (2011) [7].  Roth has created a program that runs on 
Amazon’s EC2 to brute-force wireless network passwords by 
testing approximately 400,000 passwords per second.  
According to his research, ‘the average password is guessed in 
six minutes’ at a cloud computing cost of $0.28 to $1.68 per 
minute.  Previously, it would have been extortionately 
expensive to run such an attack, but based on the 
aforementioned examples, cloud computing makes these costs 
negligible [7]. These examples, demonstrate the potential of 
the computing power available as a potential launch pad for 
further attacks. 
Similarly, the large volumes of data stored in the cloud 
make it a highly attractive ultimate target to attackers [4]. 
There are many references in the literature [4, 8] relating to the 
increasing number of globally reported cyber-attacks that aims 
at stealing businesses data.  These come in the form of the 
increasing number of targets who have experienced difficulties 
in accessing data, suffered from identity fraud or been the 
victim of phishing scams.  There have also been a number of 
high profile attacks targeting large industries, which can have 
detrimental effects even if they are dealt with quickly and 
efficiently [9].  These effects include loss of client confidence, 
misuse of company resources and loss of revenue. For instance, 
the largest DDoS attack in Norwegian history disrupted the 
websites and online payment systems of five banks, three 
airlines, two telecommunication firms and one insurance 
company.  This attack was committed by an individual 
highlighting the computing power that can be leveraged by a 
single source [6]. 
Security Researchers Mary Landesman and Dave 
Monnier [10] have reported a ‘meaningful increase’ in attacks 
on cloud hosting providers [insert ref here].  These attacks 
commonly use set-up or hacked accounts to deploy command 
and control servers to conduct malicious activities.  It is 
reported that 47% of phishing attacks were from exploited web 
hosts.  This is because by updating the configuration of a single 
web host hundreds or even thousands of websites can be 
infected with phishing pages.  Known attacks have used such 
approaches to compromise nearly 20,000 websites.  This 
demonstrates that attackers are exploiting cloud computing to 
access the computing power required for larger scale 
attacks [10]. 
It has also been seen that attacks against the routers that 
control traffic and provide the backbone of the internet are 
growing in line with other cybersecurity issues.  DDoS attacks, 
such as those against Cloudflare and Spamhaus, are 
increasingly abusing the Simple Network Management 
Protocol (SNMP).  Researchers have found that in the month of 
May 2014, fourteen separate DDoS attacks made use of SNMP 
amplified reflection attacks [11].  This emphasises the rate at 
which attacks are evolving and highlights the importance of 
constantly evolving defence systems. Issues are further 
complicated by the various deployment models of the cloud 
and the responsibility of the various parties for security in each 
of these setups [12]. 
This paper aims to investigate the latest defensive systems 
proposed for use against DDoS attacks targeting the cloud 
model.  In Sections I and II, the key areas of virtualisation and 
intrusion detection and the relevant security issues with each 
are examined.  Section III presents a classification of intrusion 
detection in the cloud and highlights the main challenges 
facing their deployment. Section IV explains how 
countermeasures proposed for traditional networks are 
ineffective in cloud environments. Section V present the latest 
developments in the areas Virtual Machin (VM) security. 
Section VI, presents intrusion detection and prevention systems 
in cloud systems. Section VII focusses on defence systems 
against DDoS in the cloud.  The security issues across each of 
these areas discussed in Sections V to VI, are investigated 
along with proposed solutions.  A summary of the proposed 
solutions across these areas is presented in Section VII. Section 
VIII concludes the paper and highlights future research 
avenues. 
II. OVERVIEW OF CLOUD TECHNOLOGIES 
A. Virtualisation 
Virtualisation is the key concept behind the cloud 
computing model.  It allows programs to be portable across 
platforms as well as regulates their scalability, monitoring and 
security [13].   This technology provides interfaces, allowing 
for virtual process or system machines to be mapped onto the 
underlying hardware.  Such interfaces allow guest instructions 
provided by the user of the Virtual Machine (VM) to be 
converted into host instructions through Dynamic Binary 
Translation.  Instructions are converted in blocks rather than 
individually to provide greater efficiency and allow them to be 
saved for reuse in software caches [14]. 
A key benefit of virtualisation is that it allows multiple 
users to co-habit a single physical machine.  This leads to 
resource consolidation, increased capacity, mobility and makes 
the system easier to maintain.  Virtualisation efficiently 
supports many tenants, while attempting to isolate them from 
each other.  It provides load balancing through dynamic 
provisioning and allows the migration of VM’s between 
physical resources.  Simultaneously, virtualisation ‘poses a 
major security risk’ given the difficulty in ensuring that 
different instances running on the same physical machine are 
fully isolated [15].  Vulnerabilities in the VM or VM Manager 
(VMM) can be exploited to bypass security restrictions or to 
gain unauthorised privileges. 
Loganayagi et al. [16] argues that securing virtualisation 
technologies will improve cloud security. The key security 
mechanism of VM is isolation.  Isolation allows multiple users 
to co-habit the same physical host without data leakage 
occurring across users and without unauthorised users being 
given access to the VMs of others. However, the scalability 
features of VMs can still allow some issues to be exploited, 
e.g., expose memory and process management functionalities 
leading to privilege escalation attacks.  Defence approaches 
involving isolation can be split into those that isolate the 
running of VMs and those that focus on the isolation of shared 
resources [17]. 
B. Cloud Architecture and Service Deployment Models 
According to Jang-Jaccard [4], the typical architecture of a 
cloud computing environment can be divided into 4 layers (see 
Figure 1): 
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 The hardware layer: This is usually a data centre with 
responsibility for the physical cloud resources 
including, servers, routers, switches, power, cooling 
systems, etc. 
 The infrastructure layer: This layer is also known as 
the virtualisation layer and is used to pool resources by 
partitioning the physical resources.  This is an essential 
component of the cloud computing architecture, as 
dynamic resource assignment and other key features 
are only made available through virtualisation. 
 The platform layer: This layer consists of operating 
system and application frameworks, reducing the load 
of deploying applications directly into virtualisation 
containers. 
 The application layer: This is the domain of 
applications, which can make use of the automatic 
scaling features of the cloud. 
 
Fig. 1. Service deployment models of cloud computing [18] 
There are many different deployment models offered by 
cloud providers to adapt to client requirements. These are 
typically divided into three groups [15]: 
1) Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) provides the client 
with access to hardware in a ‘rented’ capacity.  The space on 
hardware dedicated to a particular client will vary depending 
on their demand, allowing the hardware to deal with 
fluctuations and spikes in requirements.  Out of the box, IaaS 
provides only a basic level of security, e.g., perimeter firewall, 
and therefore applications deployed in this manner will need 
higher levels of security provided at the host.  The 
responsibilities in this model vary between providers with 
some taking responsibility for the security of the infrastructure 
including the hypervisor and below, with the rest being left to 
the client.  
2) Platform as a Service (PaaS) allows users access to 
virtual operating systems on top of the hardware layer. In 
such a setup, the CSP would typically be responsible for the 
security of the hardware and operating system elements.  The 
client is responsible for the security of any further software 
that would be installed on top of these elements, i.e., at the 
application layer, the responsibility for security lies with the 
client.  The provider may use metrics to measure the security 
of the applications deployed on their services.  Below that in 
the hierarchy, it is up to the provider to offer strong 
assurances that data will not be accessible to other 
applications. 
3) Software as a Service (SaaS) adds a further layer on 
top of the PaaS, with software being provided on top of the 
virtual operating systems.  The security of the software is a 
priority as they provide a gateway to further down into the 
cloud structure.  In this model, the client is dependent on the 
CSP for security measures, because company data is stored at 
their data farms.  This storage could be located or replicated 
to aid availability to anywhere in the world. 
Across all models, the security complexities are amplified 
due to the composite relations between the different 
deployment levels and user requirements.  Security 
responsibilities needs to be particularly considered when using 
IaaS and PaaS for the development of other IT products to 
avoid introducing further security issues.  Often, all 
deployment models and their specific responsibilities will be 
outlined in the QoS contracts drawn up between all relevant 
parties. 
C. Cloud Vulnerabilities 
The openness, elasticity, and amount of data stored in 
clouds make them attractive targets for attackers.  The 
expansiveness of cloud operation across geographical and 
technological regions also brings with it the security issues 
associated with each of these areas.  Traditionally, networks 
were less distributed, making defence mechanisms focused on 
insider attacks. Given that networks are now far more de-
centralised and are connected globally via the Internet, the 
security risks in these systems have grown exponentially.  
Attackers are now able to target globally without concern over 
geographical location.  Scripts and tools for launching attacks 
against networked systems are readily available on the Internet 
and require minimal user skills to execute. 
IT users want to be assured that their data is secure.  In the 
cloud computing paradigm, security responsibilities are passed 
to an outside agency.  This can leave users feeling vulnerable, 
because they no longer control the physical storage where their 
data is residing and the legal frameworks around its protection.  
There is also the fear of limited availability or the introduction 
of further vulnerabilities, e.g., SQL injection and buffer 
overflow, which can be exploited through web browsers.  
Moreover, user interactions with the cloud are governed by 
traditional Internet protocols, e.g., HTTP, which makes it more 
difficult to identify attackers and easier for attackers to 
implement distributed attacks [19]. 
This paper pays particular attention to the vast increase in 
the number of DDoS as detailed by Wang et al. [8].  DDoS is 
an attack on system’s availability to serve legitimate users.  
These attacks can be constructed in a number of ways.  Table I 
summarises the main attacks aimed at causing this kind of 
disruption. 
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TABLE I.  COMMON DDOS ATTACKS 
Type  of Attack How it works 
Flooding 
Flooding can occur through all network and application 
layer protocols, e.g., HTTP, TCP, UDP, ICMP, etc.  It 
attempts to saturate the network bandwidth by sending 
a large volume of packets from single or distributed 
sources so that it is unavailable to process legitimate 
user traffic.  Flooding can be direct attack against the 
network or application, or reflective attacks via zombie 
machines. 
Spoofing 
This approach is used to falsify the origin of a network 
traffic to bypass filters, hide the source of an attack or 
gain access to restricted resources or services. 
User to root 
Aims to gain administrator (root) access privileges for a 
non-authorised account. 
Port Scanning 
Provides a list of open ports and the services provided 
by each; these can then be targeted by other attack 
methods.  Port scanning is used in the first stages of an 
attack cycle and comes in many forms such as TCP 
SYN, TCP ACK, TCP ECHO, TCMP SWEEP, etc. 
Oversized XML 
The attacker sends a very large XML document 
(several megabytes in size) that contains elements, 
attributes or namespaces with large names or content.  
The Document Object Model parses documents into 
memory in their entirety to be analysed increasing 
memory requirements by a factor of 2-30. 
Coercive Parsing 
The attacker sends malformed XML aimed at clogging 
up CPU cycles by incorporating many namespace 
declarations or by simply using very deeply nested 
XML structures. 
Web Service-
addressing 
Spoofing 
This is an extension of the spoofing attack, where the 
ReplyTo or FaultTo address in a SOAP header is 
falsified leading to a reflective attack.  
Reflective attack 
Request messages are sent to reflector machines via 
zombie machines containing the spoofed source IP 
address of the victim.  The genuine replies to these 
requests are then sent to the victim causing flooding.  
Such attacks include ICMP ECHO reply flood, Smurf 
attack, Fraggle attack, DNS flood and SYN ACK(RST) 
flood.   
In traditional networked systems, the disruptions caused by 
a DDoS attack against a particular target is limited to that 
target’s resources or services.  When this paradigm is 
transferred to the cloud, the potential for disruption crosses 
traditional organisational boundaries.  This is because data is 
managed by a common CSP and the data of different 
organisations may be stored on the same physical hardware.  
Therefore, the scalability of cloud computing is what presents 
its main security challenges when compared to traditional 
networks. 
III. INTRUSION DETECTION TECHNIQUES IN CLOUD 
A. Intrusion Detection 
Intrusion detection is the first step in identifying a 
malicious behaviour against a system.  The key challenge is to 
reliably differentiate between legitimate users and attack 
traffic.  There are two standard approaches used by Intrusion 
Detection Systems (IDS), these are knowledge-based intrusion 
detection and behaviour-based intrusion detection [20]. 
Knowledge-based systems must possess an attack 
description, typically a signature that can be matched to attack 
manifestations.  Signatures range from simple pattern matching 
to network packets, such as those used in BRO, ASAX and 
NADIR systems [21], building up to neural networks that map 
multiple sensor outputs to abstract attack representations.  
Jang-Jaccard [4] argues that signature-based systems are 
ineffective given the constantly evolving landscape of cyber-
attacks.  While it is true that this approach requires constant 
updates as new signatures are identified, the simplicity of its 
structure allows it to be rapidly deployed across systems.  In 
addition, the knowledge databases used provide effective 
attack classification allowing a more directed response to be 
triggered. 
Behaviour-based, also known as anomaly-based, systems 
are designed to evolve to meet new, previously unseen threats.  
They involve monitoring network attributes and assume that 
the behaviour of malicious parties is noticeably different to that 
of legitimate users.  This assumption allows anomalies to be 
flagged and alarms to be raised.  These systems often require a 
training period to build a model of network attributes, which 
raises the cost of their implementation.  The usability of these 
systems is dependent on the False Alarm Rate (FAR) that they 
generate, which is made up of both false-positive alarms 
(raising an alarm for legitimate traffic) and false-negatives (the 
failure to register an intrusion attacks).  This approach can 
struggle to classify attacks allowing only a general system 
response to be triggered, yet, it can respond to previously 
unseen cyber-attacks. 
Compared to IDS, Intrusion Detection and Prevention 
Systems (IDPS) include preventative measures to stop attacks 
in real time rather than simply detecting them once they occur.  
These systems follow the design principles of IDS, but also 
take preventative action such as logging a user off, initiating 
system shutdown, halting the system or disabling 
connections [22]. 
B. IDSs Classification and Challenges 
In general, IDS systems designed for cloud computing can 
be classified into four main categories [23]: 
1) Host-based IDS (HIDS): These systems monitor and 
analyse log files, security access and user login information to 
detect intrusive behaviour. 
2) Network-based IDS (NIDS): These systems monitor IP 
and transport layer headers with behaviour being compared 
with previously observed behaviour in real time.  This 
approach does not work with encrypted network traffic. 
3) Hypervisor-based IDS (HyIDS):  These systems allow 
users to monitor and analyse communication between VMs, 
within the VMM-based virtual network and between the VMM 
and VMs.  These systems benefit from an availability of 
information that can be analysed to detect intrusions. 
4) Distributed IDS (DIDS): DIDS consists of a number of 
IDSs (HIDS and NIDS) placed across a large network.  These 
individual IDSs communicate with each other via a central 
analyser, which aggregates system information from the 
different IDSs.  This system benefits from the qualities of both 
HIDS and NIDS to detect known and unknown attacks.  
However, there is a high computational cost in the 
communication between these systems.  In a cloud computing 
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environment, the central analyser can be placed on a host 
machine or at the processing server.  However, if the analyser 
is compromised or unable to communicate, then the system 
will not be able to react to further threats. 
IDPS can prove to be an invaluable tool in the early 
detection of malicious activity helping to prevent attacks from 
succeeding.  They can also gather forensic evidence.  However, 
traditional IDPSs are largely inefficient when applied to cloud 
computing given its openness. Patel [12] investigates the 
requirements of IDPS in the cloud architecture given the 
ineffectiveness of traditional methods by asking what criteria 
and requirements should an IDPS meet to be deployed on the 
cloud? Which methods or techniques can satisfy these 
requirements? The list below outlines some of the challenges 
that traditional IDPS struggle to counter: 
 They do not scale to deal with cloud requirements and 
do not satisfy the requirements of high-speed networks. 
 The traffic profiles of networks changes frequently 
rendering the audit data used to train the IDPS 
unsuitable very quickly. 
 They generate high false alarm rate [24]. 
 There is no uniform standard or metric for evaluating 
an IDPS, which can often lead to misleading 
information as to their effectiveness. 
 It is very difficult to identify internal intrusion attacks 
given that correctly configuring the systems and 
implementing organisational policies is a difficult task. 
IV. DISTRIBUTED DENIAL OF SERVICE (DDOS) ATTACKS 
AND TRADITIONAL COUNTERMEASURES 
The most common attack vector that has been used to 
attempt to adversely affect cloud services is DDoS attacks. A 
DDoS attack aims to render the computing resources of the 
victim unavailable by modifying the system configuration or 
by sending it too high workload.  Moore [25] determined that 
in 2006 the average rate during a DDoS attack was 500 
requests per second and that attack typically lasts less than five 
minutes.  These figures may well now be considered out of 
date with Goel et al. [26] noting attacks with a rate of greater 
than 100Gbs. 
DDoS attacks can be divided into two general categories, 
application level attacks and infrastructure level attacks.  In 
application level attacks, e.g., HTTP flood, zombie machines 
establish TCP connections to the victim server and send 
legitimate requests.  Systems used to detect such attacks can 
struggle to differentiate between attacks and busy periods, such 
as the start of the workday where many legitimate users may 
attempt to access resources simultaneously.  One method for 
dealing with these attacks is the use of CAPTCHA puzzles.  
However, these puzzles are only suitable for an initial user 
login or registration; the user may become frustrated with the 
service if they are used any more frequently. 
Infrastructure level attacks require the attacker to send a 
flood of packets to the victim server in to saturate or bottleneck 
the victim so that it can not respond to legitimate requests.  For 
this type of attack only the victim’s IP address needs to be 
known.  Typical direct infrastructure layer attacks include TCP 
flood, UDP flood, ICMP flood and SYN flood. 
Traditionally, well-known countermeasures have focussed 
on dealing with DDoS attacks through a variety of methods 
devised around the questions [27]: (1) Where is the attack 
detected? (2) How is the attack detected? (3) What is the 
response mechanism? (4) Where to apply the response 
mechanism? (5) Where is the control (decision) centre from 
which filtering rules are taken? 
The most common DDoS defence approaches combine 
elements located in the source-end and victim-end in to 
combine their advantages.  However, the use of multiple 
components leads to gaps in coverage, which can be exploited.  
The source-end is the location from which the attack is 
launched; this is the best place to intercept an attack as it 
causes the least disruption to legitimate traffic. However, 
distinguishing between legitimate and malicious traffic at this 
point is a serious challenge.  D-WARD [27] is a system that 
employs a firewall at the source end.  It gathers 2-way statistics 
from the border routers.  This introduces significant overhead 
because D-WARD is continuously monitoring and classifying 
traffic based on IP address, comparing statistics and applying 
filtering rules.  The operation of D-WARD affects the speed of 
the entire network whether there is an attack or not.  Beitollahi 
et al [27] suggest that there is no benefit for deploying source-
end firewalls considering the overhead  and performance loss 
they introduce.  Yet, a user would not want his networks to be 
compromised and turned into a pad to launch further attacks.  
This is more critical when considered in the cloud computing 
paradigm, where undetected intrusion has the possibility of 
giving an attacker access to a far greater amount of resources 
than a traditional network could provide.  The CSP would need 
to balance the the threat of becoming a source of an attack with 
the detriment in service provided to legitimate users. 
DDoS traffic is easier to identify at victim-end points. IDPS 
at these points are effective at generating attack signatures, 
which they can then be used by upstream routers to rate-limit 
or filter traffic. However, by this point the bandwidth of the 
network could be saturated.  Moreover, these infrastructural 
approaches require the cooperation of multiple Internet Service 
Providers (ISP) to cover the required range of administrative 
domains.  There are also issues with security and 
authenticating the communication channels. 
For the reasons given above, the majority of traditional 
DDoS countermeasures are ineffective against application 
layer attacks.  This is mainly because the packets have been 
transferred and the TCP handshakes have been completed 
meaning that the packets appear to be legitimate.  Packet 
sniffing protocols are therefore ineffective at this level. 
V. VM COMMON SECURITY VULNERABILITIES AND 
DEFENCE MECHANISMS 
Virtualisation is the key underlying technology of the cloud 
computing model and therefore its security needs to be 
considered as the foundations of any proposed system.  
Particularly, the fundamental weaknesses in the VM 
architecture need to be addressed to enhance security across 
other layers. For instance, attackers on the same physical 
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machine can use malicious code to get control of other VMs.  
They can then deploy a class of rootkits, e.g., UMBR, which 
operate under the operating system.  These rootkits cannot be 
removed easily and are difficult to detect [13].  There are also 
attacks targeting VM migration. 
Isolation is the key security feature to protect VMs from 
malicious attacks.  The isolation-based defence approaches can 
be split into those that isolate the running of VMs and those 
that focus on the isolation of shared resources [17]. The first 
approach can limit the ability of the system to schedule the 
work of legitimate VMs.  To implement the second approach, a 
monitoring and mediation mechanism is needed to probe all 
resource requests and to allocate these requests to VMs.  In 
addition, to implement the strict policies needed to enforce 
isolation takes many OS hooks and is difficult to enforce 
across a large-scale distributed system. 
Volokyta [28] suggests a VM Monitor to secure VMs.  The 
proposed system intercepts system calls and maintains a log 
file of system warnings.  The authors do not give the practical 
design details and experimental results. Therefore, it is not 
possible to comment on the performance of this system.  
However, VM management systems are frequently part of 
security design specifications. 
Yu et al. [17] consider Chinese Wall properties, where an 
object can be read if the subject has accessed a prior object 
from the same dataset or the objects conflict of interest is set to 
new.  This system records the behaviour of VMs to obtain 
traces used to calculate the Aggressive Conflict of Interest 
Relation (ACIR) or Aggressive in Ally with Relation (AIAR).  
Isolation rules are combined with constraint relations to get the 
access matrix, which records the maps to give dynamic updates 
between the VMs and hosts.  An algorithm is implemented to 
guarantee isolation between conflicting users.    In this 
approach, specific monitoring systems are not required, but a 
trade-off is made between security and resource utilisations.  
To further improve this system, more efficient methods for 
conflict analysis are needed.  A suggestion for enhanced 
isolation using ACIR and AIAR to describe constraint relations 
has been put forward by in [17]. 
Lui et al. [29] suggest a framework for enhancing VMs 
security in clouds using module measure.  Metrics of the 
executables running in VMs are taken and compared to a 
reference table of trusted measurements.  This aims at 
combating user-level security in SaaS, where many individual 
users access a single instance of an application.  In this 
framework, a trusted VM is used to monitor other VM 
instances, meaning that the status of the measurement module 
needs to be noted to ensure that the system can be trusted. 
Another approach, presented by Williams et al. [30] is to 
use N-version programming in the construction of VMs.  The 
authors introduce diversity in VM design to avoid a sequence 
of events that leads to failure.  This approach lends itself to 
automation making it scalable, but can make the development 
of compatible systems difficult.  The proposed structure 
provides diversity during execution through Address Space 
Randomisation (ASR).  This approach does not remove 
vulnerabilities, but aims to make them more difficult to exploit, 
because an attack that works against one binary will not work 
against another.  This means that only a single instance of an 
application will be affected during each attack. 
To recapitulate, virtualisation poses a number of security 
issues that need to be addressed.  A benefit of virtualisation is 
its ability to allow users to isolate VMs and resources, which, 
theoretically, enhance security.  A number of solutions have 
been proposed to monitor and enforce the principles of 
isolation and thus secure the virtualisation layer.  A common 
suggestion is to use a VM as a designated manager to monitor 
the operation of the other VMs in the network.  If only a single 
management machine is used, then this could create a 
bottleneck in the system especially in an architecture where 
additional VMs can be generated and deployed autonomously.  
The systems reviewed could be made more suitable for a cloud 
environment if monitoring VMs could also make use of the 
scalable nature of the cloud.  This would mean that they could 
increase their number autonomously to ensure efficient 
management of resources and monitoring of isolation 
throughout periods of operation. 
VI. IDPSS IN THE CLOUD 
IDS and IDPS face difficulties when transferred from 
traditional networks to cloud-based designs.  Issues such as 
those with their deployment locations and the separation of 
legitimate traffic from malicious traffic pose real challenges 
with their implementation.  Defence systems must successfully 
determine the need for their use before they can be executed, 
otherwise the user experience will deteriorate.  The latest 
developments in IDPSs are investigated in this section’’. 
Al-Jarrah et al. [31] suggest embedding the temporal 
behaviour of attacks into a Time Delay Neural Network 
(TDNN) model to defend against probe or reconnaissance 
attacks.  The suggested system works on a universal IP plan as 
the relationships between the inputs are the keys, and no range 
or class of IP addresses is used.  This makes this system 
suitable for use in cloud computing given the scalability that it 
offers.  However, an autonomous method for including 
relationships for newly generated nodes would need to be 
created.  The experimental results show the approach to be 
effective when tested against the DARPA Intrusion Detection 
Evaluation [32] and other IDS systems such as SNORT.  The 
overheads of the system are not discussed or compared to other 
techniques, though the authors state that their ‘system is 
characterised by high throughput because after the system is 
trained, it takes constant time to detect any attack’. 
Alqahtani et al. [22] put forward a system to prevent SQL 
injection in cloud computing web-based systems using 
signature-based approaches.  They focus on the application 
layer, because web software services contain the majority of 
security vulnerabilities in cloud systems.  Automated tools, 
such as SQLmap, are identified as having the potential to be 
used maliciously by hackers to attack cloud-hosted databases.   
The presented evaluation method provides suitable metrics 
for measuring the quality of an IDPS system.  These include 
vulnerability detection, average response time and number of 
false positives.  An improvement of this system is to 
implement these measurements in other test designs to provide 
suitable data for comparing IDPS systems. 
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SNORT and OpenFlow are combined by Xing et al. [33] to 
produce an IDPS (SnortFlow) that can reconfigure a cloud 
network system in real time using Iptables.  The IDPS is made 
up of four components: 
1) Cloud cluster – this is based on the efficient parallel 
virtualisation solution, XenServer. 
2) Open Flow Switch – this connects resources on 
different cloud servers. 
3) Open vSwitch – this is the software version of the 
switch and is implemented in one of the domains of the Xen 
hypervisor. 
4) Controller – this provides centralised control over the 
enabled infrastructure.  A POX controller is easy to program 
and can synchronise both physical and virtual networks. 
This approach considers the status of the network when 
deciding, which actions to take based on the findings of 
traditional IDS approaches.  The optional response is selected 
using the graphical attack IPS NICE [33].  This decides if a 
response is necessary and chooses from options including, 
traffic redirection, traffic isolation, deep packet inspection, 
MAC address change, IP address change, block port or 
quarantine.  However, every packet is monitored by SNORT, 
which could create a bottleneck, especially under large-scale 
DDoS attack conditions.  The packet dropping rate of SNORT 
increases dramatically once the traffic rate exceeds 45,000 
packets per second [34] thought it does have a better 
throughput than some other similar systems such as 
Suricata [35]. 
Hassani [36] combine IDS, IPS and hybrid detection 
techniques (pattern matching and anomaly detection) to 
address the issues of each individual approach.  This effort 
focuses on distributed attacks coming through the 
infrastructure layer.  Individual system components each have 
their own weaknesses, which may result in some attacks going 
undetected if attackers alter the timing used during attacks to 
make these appear as random individual requests.  The 
collaborative IDS put forward makes use of the entire network 
to correlate events and to deduce a distributed attack that 
occurs in several places.  There is no implementation of the 
suggested system, which makes it is difficult to measure the 
efficiency and cost of this approach. 
Most current Intrusion Response Systems (IRS) use static 
matching to decide a suitable response action to an attack.  The 
issue with this approach is that it does not consider the status of 
the entire system.  Alazab et al. [37] suggest a system to 
improve detection efficiency.  The proposed system uses an 
Intelligent IDS (IIDS) built up of SIDS, AIDS and IRS.  The 
mechanism links the state of an attack with a response to raise 
an alarm, or to audit, hold, abort, disconnect or refuse packets.  
The IRS uses two stages to assess the potential risks of the 
anomaly using the Microsoft DREAD model shown 
in Table II. 
Initially, the SIDS examines the content of the user request 
for currently known intrusions.  This is followed by the AIDS 
step to accommodate the shortfalls of the SIDS.  The AIDS 
assumes that any request received from the user is an anomaly 
unless proven otherwise.   
TABLE II.  MICROSOFT DREAD MODEL [36] 
Damage Potential 
How great is the damage if the vulnerability is 
exploited? 
Reproducibility How easy is it to reproduce an attack? 
Exploitability How easy is it to launch an attack? 
Affected Users 
As a rough percentage, how many users are 
affected? 
Discoverability How easy is it to find the vulnerability? 
A risk assessment matrix is then used to determine whether 
the request is fulfilled or which action is taken.  The IIPS is 
flexible enough to accommodate different web application 
architectures.  This is aided by the fact that the communication 
of the SIDS and AIDS are based on web application 
architecture. 
VMFence is a system put forward by Jin et al. [34], which 
uses a VM Monitor based IPS to monitor network flow and file 
integrity in real-time.  The defence of the network and file 
integrity protection varies with the state of the VM.  This 
approach is based on the fact that virtualisation-based cloud 
computing comes down to the security of virtualisation itself. 
The system uses a privileged VM and contains 5 phases: 
1) Detection – This captures all network packets and 
dispatches them to other detection processes according to 
their MAC address. 
2) Policy Updating Component – Used for intrusion 
response and collects all alerts. 
3) Front-end to Back-end Communication – Updates the 
firewall rules in real-time. 
4) File Integrity Monitoring – Observes read/write 
operations. 
5) Notification – Receives service type and sensitive files 
defined by cloud users.  This unit also collects alerts for the 
cloud provider. 
Snort is used as an IDS. Iptables are used as a firewall with 
policies being updated via a shared page located in the 
XenStore.  The back-end and front-end communicate via the 
event channel.  This approach is faster than traditional response 
by network.  File integrity is monitored on the blktap 
mechanism that can directly manage disk activities with small 
performance overhead.  VMFence uses a privileged VM to 
monitor the other VM nodes, which cause a bottleneck in the 
system.  However, this system can make use of scalability 
properties of the cloud to relieve any bottlenecking. 
The reviewed solutions in this section outline many issues 
with the design of current IDS and IDPS systems.  Common 
themes can be drawn across all of the proposed systems 
regarding the size of system overheads, how to react once an 
alert is triggered and how to effectively reduce the false alarm 
rate.  Many proposed systems focus on detecting a single style 
of attack or protecting a single layer of the cloud architecture.  
Although these approaches can be successful in providing 
security to one part of the cloud, a cohesive and adaptable 
system is required to avoid the layering of individual security 
components.  The use of many individual defence systems can 
lead to the development of further vulnerabilities along the 
protection vulnerabilities of each of these systems.  There is no 
standardised procedure for measuring the quality and 
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effectiveness of an IDS making comparisons between 
proposals difficult.  Implementing a standardised set of metrics 
would enable performance comparison of various systems and 
allow the strengths and weaknesses of each to be identified as 
well as highlighting areas for further research in the field. 
VII. SYSTEMS FOR DEFENDING AGAINST DDOS IN THE 
CLOUD 
DDoS attacks can render CSPs unable to provide their 
users with the service as outlined in their QoS documents 
and/or they have their resources manipulated to launch an 
attack against external targets.  This section builds on the 
knowledge of the cloud architecture and IDPSs to analyse 
proposed systems aimed at protecting the cloud against DDoS 
attacks. 
Yang et al. [38] propose a trace-back and filter system to 
protect the cloud from DDoS attacks.  The current packet 
tracing methods of Probabilistic Packet Marking (PPM) and 
Deterministic Packet Marking (DPM) will become ineffective 
with the introduction of IPv6. To overcome this, trace-back is 
implemented by adding a tag to Service Orientated 
Architectures (SOA) packets to record the route taken. This 
method is rather limited in its effect to counter DDoS attacks, 
because the tag is only added to the packet once it is relatively 
close to the server.  When an attack is launched via the 
Internet, SOA packet tracking does not provide enough 
information to identify the source of the attack.  The tests 
presented by the authors do not consider spoofed IP addresses 
or the use of zombie machines in the attack.  The attacker does 
not need to cover the locations of zombie or spoofed machines, 
as the overall source of the attack will remain protected.  
Another weakness is assuming that even whilst under attack, 
the system will operate properly and communicate correctly 
with the upstream filters.  These filters are expected to remove 
attack traffic, but the authors assumes that attack traffic is all 
coming from single sources.  If the bandwidth is flooded, then 
the deployment of these resources can not be relied upon. 
Another trace-back model is suggested by Joshi et al. [39] 
using DPM and training data to inform the filters in a neural-
network.  The future of DPM may be limited with the 
introduction of IPv6 and the fact that trace-back tags can only 
be introduced once a packet is within the cloud network. This 
system has a success rate of correctly identifying 
approximately 75% of attack traffic, though its ability to detect 
currently unknown attacks is not researched.  It has a 
significant time variation in the detection rate of attack traffic 
from 20ms to 1s; an overhead that may cause disruption to 
legitimate users when accessing systems even if an attack is 
not taking place. 
Karnwal et al. [19] introduce a filtering tree to act as a 
service broker within a SOA.  They investigate the 
vulnerabilities in standardised cloud APIs and how they can be 
exploited when used in provisioning, management and 
monitoring of services.  They propose adding a signature 
reference element to each SOAP request to ensure that it comes 
from a legitimate source.  Double signatures are created using 
hashed characteristics of each SOAP envelope, such as the 
number of child or header elements.  The client IP address is 
also maintained in the message header along with a puzzle that 
is stored as part of the WSDL file.  Scanning each packet 
individually will eventually lead to bottlenecks.  IP trace-back 
is put forward as a method for discovering the source of attacks 
and updating defence systems to drop packets from that 
location.  However, the system will remain ineffective in 
dealing with flooding attacks from distributed sources or those 
using spoofed IP addresses. 
Vissers et al. [40] work aims to deal with DDoS attacks at 
the application layer.  Their solution aims to protect primarily 
against HTTP flooding, Oversized XML, Coercive parsing, 
Oversized Encryption and Web Service-addressing spoofing.  
A reverse proxy is added as a filter to intercept all service 
requests.  It is claimed that this filter adds no overhead to the 
cloud operation and that users experience no effect to their 
service.  The web service itself is only accept requests that 
come from the defence server.  If the server itself is directly 
flooded, then the server’s reaction to legitimate requests will be 
affected. Initially, the system processes the HTTP header to get 
the size of the request, to see if the packet is oversized.  
Reading the header also means that the number of requests 
from a single client in a given period can be limited to enable 
fast detection of HTTP floods.  To provide further security, 
strong authentication is imposed on users attempting to connect 
to web services.  This helps protect against ‘meek’ attacks, 
where a large number of zombie machines make a low rate of 
individual requests that can collectively lead to DDoS.  The 
SOAP action header is then taken and used to determine the 
requested operation of the packet without having to examine all 
of the XML content.  The action header could be spoofed by 
malicious parties and therefore further checks are required to 
verify if this is the case.  The second phase involves processing 
the key properties of the XML content and comparing them 
against the pre-determined attack models. WS-addressing 
spoofing is also extracted before the header details and content 
processes are compared to determine if they match.  The results 
presented are encouraging, but are limited in the sense that 
only a single platform set-up is tested with a single-target web 
application.  In addition, the attack tool could not generate 
attacks involving encryption or signatures and oversized 
encryption attacks were sent directly from legitimate sources.  
This system requires further development to cover multiple 
platforms and applications to reflect its performance in real 
world scenarios. 
Another application layer DDoS IDPS specifically 
designed to deal with Low and Slow (LOS) attacks is presented 
in [41].  These attacks are rarely detected using pattern 
matching or threshold measuring techniques given their low 
resource consumption approach.  The authors propose a 
reference-based architecture to mitigate DDoS attacks by 
utilizing a Software Defined Infrastructure (SDI).  
Senthilmahesh et al. [42], Mathew et al. [43] and Tang et 
al. [44] describe techniques used for detecting LOS DDoS in 
the proposed system.  The system introduces a ‘healing’ 
approach that is implemented if an intrusion is detected.  This 
approach involves migrating legitimate users from 
compromised to newly generated VMs.  ‘Shark Tanks’ are 
introduced as quarantine areas for potentially malicious traffic.  
This allows suspect users to be monitored more closely, while 
continuing to receive a suitable level of application access in 
(IJACSA) International Journal of Advanced Computer Science and Applications, 
Vol. 6, No. 6, 2015 
9 | P a g e  
www.ijacsa.thesai.org 
case a legitimate user is wrongly redirected.  The locations of 
the Shark Tanks are disguised using OpenFlow switches, 
which can rewrite packet headers so that attackers are unaware 
that they are being monitored.  The system and clusters are 
described using Domain Specific Language (DSL) and the use 
of VMs means that the system is scalable.  Two concrete 
implementations of the design are put forward.  However, the 
results of these implementations are not compared against 
existing systems or each other. 
Wang et al. [8] use the autonomous generation properties of 
the cloud to base service delivery on randomly generated and 
assigned proxy nodes.  This restricts the information that 
attackers can determine through reconnaissance attacks with all 
internal IP addresses being kept hidden.  Attacking machines 
using spoofed IP addresses become ineffective, as they will not 
receive server reassignment messages.  Strong authentication 
techniques are proposed to prevent external attackers from 
accessing proxy nodes.  The application server will only accept 
requests from a designated ring of proxy nodes and from 
clients who have made a successful connection.  Connections 
are monitored by tokens passed between the user and the 
authentication server.  The presented solution focuses on 
preventing ‘insider’ attacks by imposing strong authentication 
to connect to a proxy node, which will stop external attackers 
from launching an attack unaided.  The benefits of the 
proposed system are that it make use of the properties of the 
cloud allowing it to scale and it does not require universal 
deployment to provide protection.  However, the system relies 
entirely on the IP addresses of key components, mainly the 
application server, being kept hidden but there is no 
explanation as to how this can be achieved.  Currently, all of 
the datasets used to generate the models used by the system are 
stored centrally by the application server.  The authors 
acknowledge as being an issue, the application server itself 
may become even more of a target. An effective fix to this 
problem is to distribute these datasets. 
Wang at al. [8] propose a greedy algorithm to deliver a 
‘near-optimal’ method for assigning users to proxy nodes. 
Users are ‘shuffled’ between newly generated nodes when an 
attack is detected against a proxy node.  The repeated shuffling 
of users allows the system to identify the insiders provoking 
the attack.  This work is extended by Jia et al. [45], who 
introduce a selection of algorithms to optimise runtime 
reassignment plans.  They optimise the greedy algorithm in the 
form of a dynamic programming algorithm. The real-world 
implementation of this algorithm is very computationally 
expensive.  Both solutions use the number of persistent bots, 
containing the intelligence to follow migrating servers, as a key 
parameter for calculating the optimised ‘shuffling’ pattern. 
However, in the real-world this value is unknown and can only 
be estimated. 
Jia [45] extends the system proposed in [8] to provide 
security at the application layer and to offer security for 
anonymous users by removing the need for strong client 
authentication.  This produces a generic DDoS protection 
product that can be deployed by non-ISP organisations. This 
product is efficient at mitigating DDoS attacks and is more 
cost-effective than static based systems.  Both [8] and [45] do 
not discuss how the attack is detected by the proxy node, they 
only give the response that is used to identify and dispel the 
source.  Implementation overheads are discussed and are 
dependent on the number of shuffles required.  They are also 
dependent on the size of the geographical area covered, which 
could be global in a cloud computing context. 
Another attempt at using the capabilities of the cloud in a 
DDoS defence is proposed in [17].  This system aims to protect 
individual cloud users by creating clones of virtual IPS to filter 
traffic.  A queueing algorithm is defined to determine the 
number of IPS clones necessary to defeat the DDoS attack and 
maintain acceptable QoS.  This system is based on the 
assumption that to defeat DDoS attacks, the defence system 
must have access to greater resources than those of the 
attackers. Compared to the research in [25], this is feasible 
when applied by a CSP.  This means that DDoS attacks are 
currently unlikely to be able to affect an entire cloud service.  
However, the cloud resources available to individual clients are 
likely to be more limited making them still susceptible to these 
attacks.  The authors assume that the number of service 
requests follows a Poisson distribution during both normal 
usage and attack periods, and that the rate of legitimate 
requests remains constant during both periods.  Therefore, the 
average time that a packet is in the system provides a suitable 
measure of QoS.  The theoretical results provided assume that 
the IPS cloning solution is effective and that the cloud contains 
enough idle resources to overcome the attack.  The economic 
cost of implementation is also considered using the Amazon 
cloud (EC2) pricing model. 
Huang [46] proposed a low reflection ratio mitigation 
system to be deployed in front of the IaaS.  The system consists 
of Source Checking, Counting, Attack Detection, Turing test 
and Question Generation modules.  In the implementation of 
their defence system, the authors take into account the 
challenges of computational efficiency and overheads and their 
effect on legitimate users.  The Turing test is embedded in the 
kernel and uses text-based questions generated using Lexical 
Function Grammar (LGF).  This approach requires less 
bandwidth than the more traditional image-based puzzles, such 
as CAPTCHA.  A blacklist, whitelist, block list and unknown 
are used to categorise incoming packets based on IP addresses. 
These lists are maintained by administrators through APIs.  
The use of these APIs opens the system to malicious 
manipulation from insiders. Although this system uses the 
cloud capabilities to provide protection against bottlenecks, it 
incurs an operational degradation of 8.5% when monitoring 
traffic against a blacklist of 100000 addresses. 
Fujinoki et al. [47] build on the limitations of overlay 
networks in hiding the location of target servers through the 
use of gateway routers.  The suggested Dynamic Binary User 
Splits (DBUS) system protects clouds from insider attacks and 
compromised user host machines.  DBUS avoids the need for 
migration of network items to other hosts.   It also removes the 
need to monitor all network traffic, which provides lower 
computational overhead.  Each proxy router contains a Bloom 
filter, which is a data structure that can efficiently test for the 
presence of certain values.  A user management table is used to 
hold records of which users are assigned to which proxy nodes 
and no user can return to a previous proxy once they have 
migrated.  When an attack warning is issued, more user proxy 
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machines are deployed with the number of users assigned to 
each being halved until attackers are identified.  Simulations 
results proves the DBUS a promising system. Yet, there is a 
need for this system to be implemented in a real-world 
environment and evaluated under real-world conditions. 
Tripathi et al. [48] investigates the use of the open-source 
tool Hadoop in providing a DDoS defence.  Hadoop provides 
tools that use the MapReduce framework for processing large 
amounts of data in association with the Hadoop Distributed 
File System (HDFS).  The authors approach overrides the 
traditional First in First Out (FIFO) scheduling mechanism 
with a Self-Adaptive MapReduce (SAMR) scheduling 
algorithm, which divides jobs into tasks that are then assigned 
to map nodes.  The benefit of SAMR is that it also reads the 
historical information that is stored on each node and adjusts its 
task distribution based on this information.  By measuring 
nodes performance, the task execution time can be improved 
by up to 25%.  Hadoop is capable of efficient network 
behaviour analysis. However, its current implementation needs 
further optimisation to be used for cloud defence. 
An alternative method for detecting DDoS flooding attacks 
is presented in [49].  A distance estimation technique is used to 
estimate traffic rates.  The distance value is calculated using 
the Time-To-Live (TTL) of a packet.  The majority of 
operating systems only accept initial TTL values of 30, 32, 60, 
64, 126 and 255 making the estimated distance the smallest of 
these values that is greater than the current TTL value.  
Exponential smoothing is then implemented to provide the 
real-time measurement of the roundtrip of IP traffic.  Finally, 
absolute deviation is used to determine if the behaviour is 
abnormal.  This approach attempts to avoid the reliance on 
attribute dependences that can be spoofed or the time delays 
associated with traffic monitoring.  The authors suggest that 
ISPs should be responsible for implementing filters on traffic 
as they receive the packets.  As previously discussed, this 
practice is unlikely to be adopted. 
Latif et al. [50] review approaches to protect against DDoS 
attacks focussing on Wireless Body Area Networks (WBANs).  
WBANs devices are limited in computational power, available 
bandwidth, security and battery life. This makes them ideally 
partnered with the cloud, where much of the complex 
computational requirements can be moved.  Due to resource 
restrictions, there is a need for minimal overheads in any 
WBAN DDoS defence system.  A number of approaches has 
been proposed to address this requirement. For example, the 
system described in [51] places IDS’ at different locations in 
the cloud space and then has them collaborate to share attack 
alerts.  This approach assumes that a node will have the 
available bandwidth to send an alert when it is under attack.  
In [52], a simple IDPS that uses a statistical method to create 
and apply a covariance matrix of network behaviour is 
proposed.  Current network behaviour is compared to the 
created model, while the TTL of packets is used to identify the 
source of the attack.  In [53], a similar behaviour-based system 
featuring a training period is presented.  The system computes 
a score for each packet.  These scores are then used to 
determine which packets to drop in an attack scenario.  This 
approach delivers a high-speed system with minimal memory 
requirements and an acceptable level of filtering accuracy.  
This makes it suitable for real-time implementation.  A 
correlation pattern detection module was added to this system 
by Priyanka et al. [54] to overcome the flaws in the 
Confidence-based Filtering (CBF) by introducing a confidence 
value to the packet header. 
As shown in this review of the recent IDPSs, there have 
been many suggestions for tackling DDoS attacks against the 
cloud computing paradigm.  The cloud architecture pose many 
security vulnerabilities at different level, which resulted in 
solutions being proposed to primarily defence against a single 
type of or point of attack.  An important step forward is the 
utilisation of the cloud capabilities in the design of defence 
systems.  This enabled systems to adopt the scalability 
properties of the cloud to enhance the security for all parties.  It 
is important for security solutions to provide protection for 
individual clients and their services as well as the cloud as a 
whole.  Commonly, individual client applications and web 
services will be the targets of DDoS attacks.  Individual clients 
will only notice issues with their own QoS and these are the 
issues that will further perpetuate the security fears of adopting 
cloud computing architectures.  To develop a comprehensive 
defence system, aspects of these research solutions need to be 
integrated in one product to protect against a wider range of 
attacks.  System designers should pay particular attention to the 
‘secure’ integration of the cloud underlying technologies to 
avoid introducing further vulnerabilities to the cloud 
architecture. 
VIII. SUMMARY OF FEATURES – DDOS CLOUD PROTECTION 
SYSTEMS 
In this section, we present a summary of all man concepts 
discussed in previous sections. The reviewed different attacks 
are listed with their corresponding response mechanisms. The 
recent solutions for various security issues are also grouped 
into logical categories to make gaps in the literature more 
obvious. This is followed by a taxonomy that attempts to 
classify DDoS protection systems, which have been proposed 
for the cloud computing paradigm.  A description of each 
classification category and the order in which they have been 
applied is given in Table IV. 
Figure 2, translates the taxonomy given in Table IV to a 
flow chart showing the exiting DDoS cloud protection systems 
and comparing the implementation of different features in the 
proposed systems.  This allows us to see common techniques 
and highly secure facets of the systems, while also highlighting 
weaknesses and the areas of focus for future work in these 
areas. 
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TABLE III.  SUMMARY OF CLOUD PROTECTION SYSTEMS KEY FEATURES 
A. Intrusion Detection 
Description:  All systems identified in this survey make use of intrusion detection to raise an alarm and to determine which response to adopt.  
Currently, statistical models are the most widely used methods for detecting intrusions.  Other methods include the use of Artificial Intelligence and 
Neural Networks. 
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 Used for identifying previously known attacks. 
 Attack signatures stored in databases. 
 Simple to implement. 
 Require frequent updates to maintain security level. 
 Slow to react to new attacks, as new behaviours signatures need to be added to the relevant databases. 
 The aim is to define suitably abstract signatures that can potentially recognise new attack designs based on previously identified 
patterns. 
 Provides effective attack classification, which allows a more targeted response to be triggered. 
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 Monitors network attributes. 
 Assumes that malicious network behaviour is noticeably different to regular behaviour. 
 Able to detect unknown attacks. 
 The usability of these systems is dependent on the false alarm rate. 
 Requires a system-training period.  The training period needs to be carefully selected to represent standard network behaviours. 
 Models can be updated with new information while deployed.  This may be required as business practices evolve. 
 Data analysis tools, such as Hadoop, can be used to create models and monitor real-time behaviour [48]. 
 Suitable behaviour models are difficult to create given the user flexibility that the cloud introduces. 
 Can struggle to classify the type of attack meaning that only generalised responses can be issued. 
 Greater implementation complexity. 
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 A combination of knowledge-based and anomaly-based IDSs used to combine the strengths of both of types of approach. 
 Highest level of complexity to implement. 
 Higher overheads as packets are monitored through multiple types of IDS. 
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 Deploying IDSs close the server makes identification of attacks easier.  It also limits the effectiveness of countermeasures. 
 Deploying IDS further from the server or external to a perimeter firewall makes the identification of an attack more complex.  
However, this allows countermeasures to have a greater impact. 
B. Responses 
Description: The reaction of a system once an intrusion or attack has been detected.  This can involve responses to neutralise an individual attack and 
the introduction of preventative measures to secure the system against future attacks of the same nature.  These responses have been summarised into 
categories. 
F
il
te
r
in
g
  Update upstream filters to block traffic once the source is identified.  This assumes that there is enough bandwidth to send these 
messages.  This may be compromised in a DDoS attack scenario. 
 Deployment locations can greatly affect response outcome. 
 Update firewall protocols to include new responses. 
 Add information to packet headers to identify legitimate packets [19]. 
R
a
te
 
L
im
it
in
g
 
 Attempts to relieve the pressures on bottlenecks. 
 This affects all network traffic, not just the malicious. 
A
d
a
p
t 
u
se
 o
f 
V
ir
tu
a
l 
M
a
c
h
in
e
s  Using cloud features (scalability) to increase/decrease number of VMs as required [17]. 
 Increase the number of VMs to enhance isolation (DBUS - [47]). 
 Logical and physical migration of resources [8, 45]. 
Id
e
n
ti
fy
 
a
tt
a
c
k
 
so
u
r
ce
 
 Use trace-back techniques to identify the source of attacks [39]. 
 Trace-back systems have limited effectiveness against multisource distributed attacks 
 Can fail to identify ‘spoofed’ IP addresses. 
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C. Management 
Description:  How are different aspects of the proposed system managed to ensure security. 
A
u
th
e
n
ti
c
a
ti
o
n
 
 Strong authentication for legitimate users.  Using image-based (CAPTCHA) or text-based puzzles [46]. 
 Authentication needs to avoid being obstructive to the user experience.  For example, puzzles are suitable for logins but should not be 
used for routine tasks. 
S
y
st
e
m
 M
o
n
it
o
r
in
g
 
 Several systems use VMMs to monitor the state of deployed VMs.  Having these dedicated machines is a useful consideration but 
they risk becoming a bottleneck in high traffic situations [34]. 
 Using the scalability features of the cloud to deploy further VMMs as required can reduce the risk of bottlenecks [8]. 
O
v
er
h
ea
d
s 
 The majority of systems aim to scan each packet as it enters the cloud network.  This can introduce large overheads into the system 
affecting the users QoS.  If only a single machine is allocated the task of packet monitoring, this can create a bottleneck in the system. 
 To reduce detection overheads, many systems aim to detect a limited set of attack traits. 
TABLE IV.  DDOS CLOUD PROTECTION SYSTEM TAXONOMY 
Taxonomy Layers 
ID
P
S
 
There are two fundamental approaches to intrusion detection used by the protection system.  These are typically either knowledge-based 
that use signatures to recognise attacks that have previously occurred, or anomaly-based that make use of data models to identify suspicious 
network behaviour.  Anomaly-based systems have the advantage of being able to identify previously unseen attacks; however, they can 
suffer with high false positive rates. 
Knowledge-based Intrusion 
Detection 
Anomaly-based Intrusion 
Detection 
 [19] Karnwal (2012) 
 [46] Huang (2013) 
 [47] Fujinoki (2013) 
 [17] Yu (2014) 
 [48] Tripathi (2013) 
 [54] Priyanka (2013) 
 [39] Joshi (2012) 
 [40] Vissers (2014) 
 [41] Shtern (2014) 
 [8] Wang (2014) 
 [45] Jia (2014) 
 [49] Chopade (2013) 
 [52] Ismail (2012) 
 [53] Chen (2011) 
 
V
M
 M
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t 
P
o
in
t 
Compares the use of VMM modules to manage systems.  Classification is based on whether a single VMM is used to monitor VMs 
regardless of the scale of the cloud resources being used, or whether the number of VMMs is increased when required based on cloud 
scaling principles. 
Scalable VMM system used 
(Distributed) 
Single VMM used 
(Centralised) 
 [17] Yu (2014) 
 [41] Shtern (2014) 
 [8] Wang (2014) 
 [45] Jia (2014) 
 [39] Joshi (2012) 
 [40] Vissers (2014) 
 [49] Chopade (2013) 
 [52] Ismail (2012) 
 [53] Chen (2011) 
 [19] Karnwal (2012) 
 [46] Huang (2013) 
 [47] Fujinoki (2013) 
 [48] Tripathi (2013) 
 [54] Priyanka (2013) 
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What form of user authentication is employed by the system?  Many systems incorporate authentication protocols to identify legitimate 
users.  Typically, strong user authentication involves puzzles such as CAPTCHA.  Other methods include marking packets, but these can 
suffer from spoofing attacks. Below is a classification of recent solutions by whether or not the system uses puzzles for user authentication. 
Yes No 
 [47] Fujinoki (2013) 
 [48] Tripathi (2013) 
 [54] Priyanka (2013) 
 [40] Vissers (2014) 
 [39] Joshi (2012) 
 [49] Chopade (2013) 
 [52] Ismail (2012) 
 [53] Chen (2011) 
 [19] Karnwal (2012) 
 [46] Huang (2013) 
 [17] Yu (2014) 
 [41] Shtern (2014) 
 [8] Wang (2014) 
 [45] Jia (2014) 
 
R
e
sp
o
n
se
 
What is the response method of the proposed system?  The range of response methods is quite varied and can consist of several layers but 
can be grouped into categories.  Responses include trace back techniques to discover the source of techniques, which can then be used to 
update filters.  Other responses include techniques used to filter and drop packets and user requests, and those that migrate users to new 
VMs when current ones become compromised. 
Trace back VM Migration Filters/Block 
lists/Dropped Packets 
 [19] Karnw 
(2012) 
 [39] Joshi 
(2012) 
 
 [41] Shtern 
(2014) 
 [8] Wang 
(2014) 
 [45] Jia (2014) 
 [47] Fujinoki 
(2013) 
 [46] Huang (2013) 
 [49] Chopade (2013) 
 [40] Vissers (2014) 
 [53] Chen (2011) 
 [52] Ismail (2012) 
 
 
Fig. 2.  DDoS cloud protection systems 
IX. CONCLUSION 
This paper examined the latest security issues in 
virtualisation technologies and IDPS to defend against DDoS 
attacks targeting cloud systems.  Based on this comprehensive 
review, it is apparent that approaches to security across all 
reviewed areas share many common themes.  These themes 
include: 
1) Who and how will the security system be managed and 
monitored? 
2) How will alerts be triggered? 
3) How is the false alarm rate reduced? 
4) What is the impact on operational overheads? 
With virtualisation being a key underlying technology of 
the cloud computing paradigm it is understandable that there 
are a number of similarities between proposed systems.  A 
number of these highlight the use of VMs as system 
management units and a few of these allow these to be 
generated in a similar way to user VMs in the cloud.  This 
allows these systems to make use of the elasticity and 
scalability of the cloud paradigm to provide a more effective 
response to an attack and helps to reduce bottlenecks in the 
system. 
A common response to an attack is to migrate users to new 
VMs through either physical or logical migration.  This uses 
the strengths of VMs and helps to enforce the principles of 
isolation.  Systems must be in place to remove compromised 
VMs to ensure that they are not migrated along with other 
users. 
Commonly, the response of the system is designed based 
on non-attack or low-level attack conditions.  This allows 
systems, even under test conditions to deliver the necessary 
messages to update filter protocols and perform other defensive 
manoeuvres.  It must be considered, that under high stresses 
these systems may not operate in the same manner.  Against a 
DDoS flooding attack, it may not be possible to update upriver 
(IJACSA) International Journal of Advanced Computer Science and Applications, 
Vol. 6, No. 6, 2015 
14 | P a g e  
www.ijacsa.thesai.org 
filters effectively enough to reduce the intensity of the attack.  
Proposed systems must therefore test themselves under such 
strains so that their behaviours at these attack intensities can be 
observed. 
The majority of defence systems focus on a particular type 
or point of attack against which they can be shown to be 
effective.  The next step is to integrate these approaches to 
provide a more universal protection.  When implementing this 
integration it is important that new vulnerabilities are not 
introduced into the system. 
In the authors opinion, there are two research main research 
avenues to be followed.  In the first, the intrusion is attempting 
to compromise VMs in order to launch a DDoS attack against a 
target that is external to the cloud.  Once the intrusion is 
detected, a counter-measure is to be deployed, which in this 
case will be a calibrated firewall.  Although this is may appear 
to be a simplistic fix to exiting protocols, it is not a solution 
that is widely adopted by current CSPs because it adds to their 
overheads, while not directly protecting their own 
infrastructure. The second considers a more traditional cloud 
intrusion where the target of the attack is the cloud or an 
element within the cloud itself.  Resources relevant to this 
scenario will be based in a Eucalyptus cloud system. 
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